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NOTE
The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery:
Has This Technological Advance in the
War Against Drugs Come at the Expense
of Fourth Amendment Protections
Against Unreasonable Searches?
INTRODUCTION
To say that the manufacture, production and distribution of marijuana
has become a problem in the United States would understate and belittle
the significance of the issue. According to the United States Department
of Justice, marijuana is the "most used/abused illegal drug in the United
States."1 The Department of Justice estimates there are approximately
twelve million marijuana users in the country.' Consequently, the United
States Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
allocates a significant amount of staff and money to the discovery and
destruction of marijuana growing operations throughout the country
The DEA estimates that growers raise 5200 metric tons of marijuana
in the United States annually, on both private and public lands The
profile of growers has changed dramatically over the years, making them
more difficult to find now than twenty to twenty-five years ago; the
easily identified flower children of the 1960s have changed to otherwise
law-abiding citizens and business people.' To make matters worse,
growers now have the technology to increase the potency of their
I U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMiN., DOMESTIC MARijUANA
ERADICATIoN: A SUCCESS STORY 1 (1992).
2Id.
3 Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness, S.F. CRON., Aug. 28, 1994, at ZI.
4 Richard LIkin, Kentucky's Other Grass, INsIGHT, July 1, 1991, at 12.
s Individuals prosecuted for marijuana fanning include law enforcement officers,
judges, poor struggling families, and schoolteachers. Id. at 13, 16.
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marijuana plants up to ten times that of the plants grown only twenty
years ago-' All of these factors combine to make marijuana eradication
a high priority for the DEA.7
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a nationwide law
enforcement crackdown on domestic growing operations! The number
of plants eradicated grew from 129.7 million in 1986 to 272 million in
1992.? Obviously, the aggressive efforts of the DEA have been increas-
ingly successful. However, efforts by marijuana growers to remain
undetected have also increased and these growers are now moving
indoors and underground to produce their crops."0
Increases in the number discovered by the DEA suggests that the
number of indoor operations is growing. In 1986, the DEA seized 1077
indoor growing operations; by 1992, the number of indoor operations
seized had grown to 3849.1 Indoor operations present new and com-
pounded problems for law enforcement officers.12 While the crop sizes
are smaller, indoor operations can produce up to "four full growing cycles
per year."'3 The indoor growers are well-organized, efficient, and
often well-equipped "with the latest computerized irrigation systems,
hydroponic basins, 4 heating systems, growing lamps," and other devices
to create a perfect growing environment for marijuana. 5 Not only are
the growing operations technically complex, they are often located in
creative sites which are difficult to uncover."i
6 "Seeds are specially crossbred, plants are cloned and genetically engineered by
high tech growers eager to push the potency levels to new highs." Id. at 13; see also U.S.
DEP'T OP JusTcE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 1, at 1 (stating that marijuana
is more potent than it was twenty years ago).
7 Lipkin, supra note 4, at 16.
8 Schlosser, supra note 3, at Zl.
9 U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3.
'0 Id. at 8.
' Id. at 4; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DOMESTIC
CANNABIs ERADICATION/SUPPRESsION PROGRAM 27 (1992). The 1992 figure was an
increase of 35% over the 1991 figure alone. According to some sources, the total number
of indoor operations doubles every year. Lipkin, supra note 4, at 16.
Lipkin, supra note 4, at 16.
Conventional outdoor methods, in conirast, produce only one full cycle per year.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3.
14 Indoor hydroponic growing does not require soil; the marijuana's root system is
supported by lava rocks or other porous material and water delivers "necessary life
supporting nutrients." Id.
' Lipkin, supra note 4, at 18.
1 Indoor growing operations have been discovered in residential homes, barns,
airplane hangers, beneath phony tennis courts, and in bunkers underneath an electrical
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Law enforcement officials have had to develop "innovative investiga-
tion techniques" such as Operation Green Merchant to combat the
sophistication of indoor growers."7 In addition, the DEA also employs
its own technologically advanced surveillance equipment to detect these
operations.' 8 Indoor growing operations are dependent upon high
intensity grow lamps for crop production. 9 These lamps, which can
produce temperatures of up to 150* Fahrenheit, must be vented by the
indoor grower as the optimum temperature for growing marijuana is
between 600 and 700 Fahrenheit.0 Law enforcement agencies use
thermal imagery scanning to detect the emissions from structures
suspected of housing indoor marijuana-growing operations.2' The
information given by a thermal scan often supplements the probable cause
necessary to obtain a search warrant and contributes to the discovery and
eradication of indoor operations.'
This introduction provides a brief summary of the magnitude of the
marijuana production problem in this country. While important for law
enforcement officials to correct the problem, the methods employed in the
eradication process must not interfere with protections afforded by the
United States Constitution. Specifically, the prewarrant use of thermal
imaging devices violates the Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches. This Note discusses the concerns surrounding the
power generating station. Id. at 18, 19. In Kentucky, a subterranean greenhouse was
discovered in rural Clinton County under a one hundred and fifty acre farm. The
operation had over five thousand square feet of growing space, sixty grow lamps, a water
system and storage tanks, and a ventilation system which used an above ground outhouse
to vent the heat from the operation. Gail Gibson, Marijuana Mansion, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 20, 1994, at B1, B3.
17 U.S. DEP'TOF JusTIcE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 1, at 7. Operation
Green Merchant is a special program of the DEA which focuses on domestic indoor
growing operations. It targets the 'Indoor cannabis [marijuana] cultivation industry" by
gathering information on foreign cannabis seed suppliers, hydroponic companies, and
advertisers of marijuana seeds and growing equipment/supplies. Id.
" For a description of how the DEA typically utilizes thermal imaging devices see
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1995).
9 Lipkin, supra note 4, at 17.
Lynne M. Pochurek, Note, From the Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared
Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Seige, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
137, 167 n.99 (1994).
21 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., CANNABIS DETEC-
TION/ERADICATION SCHOOL 11 (1991) (training manual for DEA agents).
' United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing thermal scan
information to supplement information from defendant's utility bills to establish probable
cause).
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use of imaging devices. Part I provides an outline of the protections under
the Fourth Amendment.23 Part II explains thermal imaging technolo-
gy.u Part III presents the prosecution and defense arguments and an
analysis of the courts' treatment of the issues involved. This Note
concludes with the suggestion that some standard of review be required
before allowing the use of thermal imagers; however, that standard should
be less than the probable cause standard required for a warrant.26
IL FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
citizens from unreasonable invasions of their privacy by the government
providing:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the things to be seized.27
The courts presume a warrantless search or seizure to be unreasonable
unless law enforcement officers can demonstrate otherwise.2 Designed
to protect citizens from unreasonable, general searches, the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement officers to seek a warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate in order to conduct a searchk A neutral
and detached magistrate reviews the affidavit and application for the
search warrant and determines whether probable cause exists?' The
sanction for failure to follow these Fourth Amendment requirements is
the exclusion of any evidence seized as a result of such violation.'
3 See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
u See infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
: See infra notes 73-164 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
27 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
' United States v. Massachuisetts, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar introduction into evidence of illegally seized material when
officers demonstrate their reasonable reliance on the validity of search warrant).
' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding recognition of opium
odor sufficient to justify a search warrant).
30 Id.
31 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained
during searches and seizures in violation ofthe Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state
[Vol. 83
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Traditionally, the courts applied the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to places or areas.' This view changed with the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz v. United States, where the Court specifically
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."33 In
Katz, the Court held that electronic surveillance of a public telephone
booth was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment where it was
performed without a search warrant.' Even though a telephone booth
is considered a public place, it ceases to be accessible to the public when
a person enters it and shuts the door.3" The Court held that electronic
surveillance "seized" the occupant's conversation and that such seizure
invokes the protection of the Fourth Amendment.' Without a seizure or
search, there would be no Fourth Amendment issue. 7
The concurrence in Katz articulated a two-part test for determining if
the Fourth Amendment applies to a particular situation.' First, did the
defendant exhibit an actual expectation of privacy?" If she did, then the
court must determine if such expectation is "one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."'" Commonly referred to as the "reasonable
expectation of privacy test," this two-part analysis has been used by
numerous courts since Katz.41
court as it is in federal court).
32 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 459 (1928) (finding
wiretapping does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it is meant to protect
'"material" things, such as places or areas, and wiretapping involves the sense of hearing
which is not a material thing) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886)).
- 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
' The Katz Court adopted the view that bypassing the advance authorization of a
magistrate ignored the "safeguards provided by an objective predetermination ofprobable
cause" and led to constitutional protections "only in the discretion of the police." Id. at
358, 359 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 97 (1964)).
" At this point, the telephone booth temporarily becomes a private place and the
occupant is entitled to be secure in the fact that his conversation is not being intercepted.
Id. at 352, 353.
3 6Id. at 353.
37Id.
-Id. at 361 (arlan, J., concurring).
9Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
4' E.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (lth Cir. 1994) (holding that
defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in heat vented from his mobile
home and that any expectation defendant may have had was unreasonable); United States
v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that aerial surveillance of
greenhouse did not amount to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment); Jabara v.
Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 278 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when summaries of his overseas telegraphic messages were
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Any use of thermal imaging devices to detect indoor marijuana
growing operations must comport with the Fourth Amendment require-
ments outlined above in order to be valid under search and seizure law.
The problem with law enforcement's current use of thermal imaging
devices is that they are typically used prior to the issuance of a warrant.
Such prewarrant use immediately raises questions regarding Fourth
Amendment compliance.
IL THERMAL IMAGING TECHNOLOGY
A. How Does It Work?
Thermal imaging devices "see" heat.42 The devices have optical
electronic sensors which sample the thermodynamic characteristics (i.e.,
heat flow characteristics) of the object upon which the imaging device is
focused.43 Heat temperature is detected with sensors that scan the
infrared wavelength portion of the electromagnetic spectrum." This
spectrum contains many different types of energy fields, each with its
own frequency of occurrence.45 The entire frequency range varies from
a few occurrences per second, to millions upon millions of occurrences
per second.4' For example, visible light occurs one hundred million
times per second and is visible because of its high rate of occurrence.47
Conversely, electrical energy is generated to occur sixty times per second
and is not visible due to its low rate of occurrence.' The infrared
section of the electromagnetic spectrum is also not visible to the human
eye due to the fact that infrared energy occurs at a rate one thousand
times slower than visible light4  The thermal energy (heat) within the
infrared spectrum can only be detected with the help of nonnatural, sense
turned over to the FBI by the National Security Agency), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1082 3.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the government's use of an
electronic transponder, which can intercept and decode messages sent over radio waves,
in an airplane).
4' U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEME ADMIN., supra note 21, at 8.4 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
4Id.
47
Id.
"Id.
49 Id.
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enhancing electronic sensors or "special film emulsions." ° Thermal
imaging devices use these electronic sensors to identify thermal ener-
gy-' The optical sensors convert the sampled thermal data into digital
information that is stored in the device's computer memory! 2 The
computer then feeds the digitally stored information to a variety of
displays including a camera, video cassette recorder and real-time video
screen where it is converted into analog or picture form and viewed by
the user. 3
The thermal imaging device does not transmit rays or pulses which
can penetrate (or see through) objects such as houses or barns.' Rather,
thermal energy is radiated from within the targeted objects and passively
scanned by the thermal imaging device.55 The thermal imaging device
can scan the outermost envelope (ie., edge) in a three dimensional
configuration.'
Types of thermal imaging devices vary in sophistication. Handheld
noncontact thermometers are the least sophisticated of the devices. They
simply display the temperature of the scanned objects.' These devices
must be operated at close range and do not indicate which "part of the
target" the device is scanning since there is no physical contact between
the temperature probe and the object and because there is no image
display.' In practice, users typically scan in several directions around
the object in order to obtain the most accurate reading.59
Handheld imaging systems are mid-level in sophistication.' These
systems can take snapshots or videotape recordings of the images
" Themial energy works on a radiated heat basis rather than a convected heat basis.
A thermal energy source radiates heat energy until it strikes another object Upon
striking another object; the energy is partially reflected, partially absorbed and
partially transmitted. A thermal imaging device detects the transmission and absorption.
Id.
, By way of contrast, a camera uses the visible light portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum. It captures the visible light in its view and freezes it into a picture. Id.
RId. at 18.
The picture is seen in black and white contrast (including shades of gray). The
brighter an image, the hotter it is or the more thermal energy it is transmitting. Id. at 8.
-" Id. at 11.
ss Thermal imaging devices sense only heat that is radiated "from the outside surface
of an object." Such heat may be 'intemal heat which is transmitted to the outside surface
of a object." Id.
56Id.
17 Id. at 18.
"Id.
9Id.
60Id.
1994-951
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scanned.6' Monochrome - black and white - displays are typically used.
The image shows the hottest objects in white; as the temperature lessens
the shade darkens. The coldest objects are blackY Some device manu-
facturers emphasize the product's high picture resolution even over very
long distances and its ability to "pan a wide surveillance area... then
switch to the narrow field of view" very quickly.'
The most sophisticated systems are High Performance Imaging
Systems." These devices boast more powerful computer processing,
software-oriented interfacing, dual-field of view lenses and even higher
image resolution capabilities, often through the use of "computerized
enhancement techniques." 5 Computerized enhancement allows the user
to obtain a clear and informative image. These devices can be pro-
grammed to detect and display "out of spec" situations such as those
involving images with thermal properties higher than typically encoun-
tered.' Additionally, these devices are compact and reliable making
them suitable for aircraft use, such as mounted under helicopters for
aerial surveillance."
B. How Are They Used?
This Note focuses on the use of thermal imaging devices in the
detection of indoor marijuana growing operations. These devices have
other drug-related uses such as the detection of indoor methamphetamine
laboratories.' They. also have a number of non-drug related uses.7
"The United States Army first developed the thermal imager to locate
enemy vehicles during combat."'71 Search and rescue operations, border
61 Id. at 19.
"Id.
The Thenmovision 1000 Forward Looking Infrared System is advertised to be able
to "detect a human being in water at 1 km or on land at 3 km." It can also go from wide
surveillance to narrow in one-half second without need for focus or contrast adjustment.
AGEMA INFRARED SYSTEMS, THERMOVISION 1000 FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED SYSTEM
(company sales brochure).
"U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., sipra note 21, at 19.
65Id.
"AGMA INFRARED SYSTEMS, TEERMOvisiON 1000, supra note 63.
67U.S. DP'T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 21, at 19.
a Id.
69 Id.
70 Infra note 72.
7
1 Melinda Foster, Note, State v. Young: A Cool iew Toward Infrared Thermal-
Detection Devices, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 135, 136 n.7 (1994-95).
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patrols for illegal aliens, utility company energy audits (to detect poorly
insulated areas), and forest fire hot spot location are other instances where
thermal imaging devices are used.' While not all inclusive, this listing
highlights the fact that thermal imaging devices have legitimate non-law
enforcement uses.
JR ARGUMENTS REGARDING
USE oF THERMAL IMAG NG DEViCES
Courts, in the federal and state systems, have held both for and
against the constitutionality of the warrantless use of thermal imaging
devices.73 The primary use of the device is to detect abnormal amounts
of radiated heat to help bolster a probable cause determination. In turn,
a warrant may be acquired to search a suspected indoor marijuana
growing site. The principal point of contention is whether conducting a
thermal imaging scan of a person's property constitutes a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If it does, then the Fourth
Amendment will require a warrant prior to the use of the thermal imaging
device. If such warrant were not obtained, the evidence acquired from a
search of the scanned property will be suppressed at trial.7 If the court
' Id. at app.; see also United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 n.4 (D.
Haw. 1991) (listing uses of the thermal imaging devices other than for the detection of
indoor marijuana growing operations), af'd, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
' See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (holding that
warrantless use of thermal imagin devices does not violate the Fourth Amendment), cert.
denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1994) (No. 94-402); United States v. Field, 855
F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that use of thermal imaging device is a
search within the Fourth Amendment and requires a warrant); State v. Young, 867 P.2d
593, 599 (Wash. 1994) (warrantless use of thermal imaging device violates the state
constitution and the U.S. Constitution).
' The mechanism used by the courts to ensure that law enforcement officials conduct
only reasonable searches and seizures is the exclusionary rule. See Deborah Connor, The
Exdusionary Rtde, 82 GEo. L.I 755, 755 (1994). Under the exclusionary rule, any
evidence obtained via an unreasonable search or seizure is inadmissible in court. Id.
To invoke the exclusionary rule, the defense files a motion to suppress and the judge
holds a hearing on the matter. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir.
1980) (in which defendant moved to suppress heroin seized from her luggage), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). If the search or seizure was performed without a warrant,
the burden will be on the prosecution to show why the conduct did not constitute a
"search!' or that the search fits within an exception to the warrant requirement (e.g., good
faith exception). United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply when police act reasonably in reliance on the validity
of a search warrant). If the prosecution's burden is not met, the evidence will not be
permitted at trial. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 852 ,(5th Cir. 1995) (holding
1994-95]
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determines that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device does not
constitute a search, then evidence obtained in a subsequent search is
admissible at trial for consideration by the judge or jury."
Arguments exist both for and against characterizing the use of
thermal imaging devices as a legitimate way to establish probable cause.
While it is important not to tie the hands of law enforcement officers in
their fight against crime, it is also important to consider the rights of
citizens granted by the United States Constitution.
A. The Prosecution's Argument: Warrantless Use of a Thermal
Imaging Device is Not a Search Under the Fourth Amendment
When conflict regarding the use of thermal imaging devices arises,
the initial burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that he had a
"reasonable expectation of privacy."76 This is the test followed by the
Supreme Court since its decision in Katz v. United States.' As noted in
the Fourth Amendment discussion,78 this is a two-part test requiring that
there be an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the
expectation is reasonably (objectively) one which society is prepared to
acknowledge.79
Showing that the defendant did not possess an expectation of privacy
is the more difficult of the two arguments for the prosecution as it is
difficult to prove what a person subjectively believes.
A thermal imaging device scans heat emissions from a structure.
Consequently, the prosecution must argue that the defendant had no
expectation of privacy in the heat being emitted from a structure they
that a warrantless use of a thermal imaging device does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
The exclusionary rule is used as a remedial device. United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d
1256, 1261 (2d Cir.) (holding that illegally seized but relevant evidence may be
considered at sentencing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992). Its purpose is to deter
unlawful/unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 643, 647 (1961).
In cases involving the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices, the defendant is
typically contesting the allowance of such evidence at the trial level by making a motion
to suppress the evidence. Connor, supra, at 755.
71 Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852.
76 See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
the use of a thermal imaging device constituted a search that did not fall within an
exception to the warrant requirement), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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owned."0 The prosecution will specifically focus on whether or not the
heat is vented.81 If the heat is vented intentionally, the prosecution
argues that defendant knowingly exposed something private to the public.
By doing so, the defendant forfeits her right to privacy in the object and
thereby loses Fourth Amendment protection of the object.' If the heat
has not been intentionally vented by the defendant, the prosecution will
still argue that there was no subjective expectation of privacy. They will
assert that, by its very nature, "heat is known to dissipate, ' " as opposed
to remaining in one place; therefore, a defendant cannot have a subjective
expectation of privacy in heat which she should know will be exposed to
the public.
The prosecution's efforts focus on showing that any expectation of
privacy the defendant may have is not reasonable and is not one society
is willing to recognize. One significant argument classifies heat emissions
as "heat waste" or "abandoned heat"' and draws an analogy to the
Supreme Court's previous holdings regarding garbage.' The heat
produced from indoor marijuana growth has been called "a waste
byproduct"' in an effort to draw similarities to garbage. It is well
established that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
that has been set out on a curb for collection.' "Just as an individual
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed garbage bag sitting
"4E.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in heat vented from his mobile
home).
" Id.; United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat vented from a
lean-to in which a marijuana-growing operation existed); United States v. Porco, 842 F.
Supp. 1393, 1397 (D. Wyo. 1994) (holding that defendant had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in heat vented from his home nor in utility company records of his electrical
usage).
I "What a person lknowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
' Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1474.
'4United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding
that the use of infrared devices in navigable airspace above defendant's residence for
purposes of detecting "waste heat" was not a search under the Fourth Amendment), aft'd,
984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
" Id.; see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that garbage
intentionally left at curb by defendant constituted an abandonment thus is open to public
inspection).
" United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant
did not have an objectively reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in heat vented
from his mobile home).
7 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
1994-95]
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beside the street... so too, he lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy
in heat emissions."' In other words, an expectation of privacy in one's
heat emissions is not one society is prepared to acknowledge.
Another argument offered by the prosecution is that heat emission is
like odor emission.' The Supreme Court has held that warrantless
surveillance of odors, in the form of a drug-sniffing dog, is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.' "Just as odor escapes a compartment or
building and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine
sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is detected by the sense-
enhancing infrared camera."'" The argument again is that any subjective
expectation of privacy is not one society is reasonably prepared to accept
In defending the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices, the
prosecution will also argue that the surveillance is not unduly invasive,
but, rather a "passive" instrument.93 The prosecution will emphasize that
a thermal imager can only "see" the exterior surface of an object it scans,
not the interior. 4 Additionally, the information disclosed is not that
which forms the basis for the need of Fourth Amendment protection.'
The prosecution will also point out that the court must focus on what
information was actually obtained from the use of the thermal imaging
device, not what may have been obtained.9 Information from the
" United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1474 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(citations omitted).
,9 E.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.) (holding escaping heat
analogous to escaping odors for Fourth Amendment purposes), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W.
3460 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1994) (No. 94-402).
o E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of
luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes); Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058.
"Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058.
"Id. at 1059; Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1474; United States v. Penny-Feeney,
773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991), af'd, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v.
McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the use of infrared
devices to detect heat escaping defendant's home was not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes), review denied, 515 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1994).
9E.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228. In other words, since the thermal
imaging device does not send rays out into an object scanned, it passively receives
information being emitted from an object. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
9E.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228.
" "[]ntimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy" are the interests requiring Fourth
Amendment protection and these items are undisturbed by a thermal scan. Pinson, 24 F.3d
at 1059; see also United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting the
language in Pinson); Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1475 (stating that information
disclosed was "neither sensitive nor personal").
"Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1473; see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
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thermal imaging device alone will not tell what is going on inside the
structure; other evidence such as excessive utility consumption will be
necessary to get a more clear idea of what occurs within the walls of a
structure.Y The prosecution hopes that these factors combine to establish
that prewarrant use of thermal imaging devices is not an unreasonable
invasion of privacy.
Further arguments supporting the prosecution's position include
reference to the use of utility company records in the investigation of a
suspect.98 The Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement
officials to obtain a warrant prior to requesting utility company records
of a suspect's property, so they logically should not be required to obtain
a warrant prior to using a thermal imaging device." Additionally, the
uses of thermal imaging devices are not limited to the area of law
enforcement." Since use of thermal imaging devices has become so
prevalent, it is harder for defendants to show that their expectations of
privacy from such devices is reasonable.
Many courts have been persuaded by these arguments and have
allowed evidence seized from a warrant based on the use of thermal
imaging devices to be used at trial....
B. Argument of the Defense: Warrantless Use of a Thermal Imaging
Device Constitutes an Unlawful Search Under the Fourth
Amendment
The defense has the burden of demonstrating both that the defendant
had a subjective expectation of privacy and that it is objectively one
which society is prepared to acknowledge. 2 To establish the existence
of a subjective expectation of privacy, the defense focuses on the nature
of heat. The dissipating nature of heat means that it automatically
476 U.S 227, 238 (1986) (holding aerial photographs did not violate Fourth Amendment,
in part because they did not disclose "intimate details").
' United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that phone
records and excessive utility bills also contributed to probable cause determination).
"E.g., United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (D. Wyo. 1994) (holding
that defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in heat vented from his home nor
in utility company records of his electric usage).
" Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1475 n.3.
'0 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 132-34, 137-39, 159-64 and accompanying text.
1 2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the
two-part requirement).
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escapes, whether or not vented. 3 This being the case, the loss of heat
"occurs, for the most part, without any conscious decision!' by the
property owner." It follows then, that what is relinquished uncon-
sciously does not cause forfeiture of an actual expectation of privacy."
The defense extends this argument to show the privacy expectation is
reasonable by stating that "it's illogical to conclude that any homeowner
gives the same thought to the escape of heat... as he or she does to the
removal of garbage."'0 6 Taking out the garbage is an affirmative,
conscious act to abandon the contents of the trash. 7 The defense
dispels the analogy of heat waste to garbage by pointing out that, while
it is "common knowledge" that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage left for collection;0 . it is not commonly known that
law enforcement officials "cruise the public streets after dark scanning
houses with thermal imagers."'" Through these arguments the defense
hopes to establish a two-fold result: not only that there is a subjective
expectation of privacy, but also that the expectation is reasonable (ie.,
one that society is willing to accept).
The second part of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test is
the more difficult argument for the defense. They have to be able to show
the "reasonableness" of defendants' privacy expectation in emitted
heat."' In addition to the above argument against the "garbage" analo-
gy, the defense also quickly distinguishes the canine sniff analogy. The
most notable distinction between a dog sniff and the use of a thermal
imaging device is that such canine surveillance takes place on public
property while a thermal scan focuses on private property, often times on
03 United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (distinguishing
heat loss, which is unconscious, from abandoning garbage, which is an affirnative
decision).
104 Id.
105Id.
106 "Id.
... Id.; see State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994) (noting that placing
garbage at the curb assumes the risk that people or animals may seize garbage).
" California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (explaining that garbage left on
a curb for collection is "readily accessible to animals, scavengers, snoops, children and
other members of the public").
" United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (distinguishing
heat loss, which is unconscious, from abandoning garbage, which is an affirmative
decision).
10 See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
the government failed to establish that thermal imaging devices were excepted from the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); Young, 867
P.2d at 603.
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the defendant's home."' Further, canines are trained to detect illegal
contraband. A thermal imaging device cannot distinguish between legal
and illegal heat."' The defense will assert that these two factors
distinguish thermal imaging devices from the "dog sniff' analogy and
provide support for the reasonableness of defendant's privacy expectation.
Additionally, the defense argues that a thermal imaging scan is
unduly invasive. The defense maintains that characterizing a thermal
imaging device as a "passive""' instrument is a "red herring."
114
Other forms of surveillance can be described as passive. For example,
high powered telescopes and nonconsensual wiretaps are passive
instruments. 5 However, these passive forms of surveillance either have
been disallowed by the courts or require a court order for their use.1
That a device can be described as passive has no bearing on whether its
use is reasonable. "7
Similarly, the defense contests the prosecution's assertion that thermal
imaging devices do not reveal activities within the property scanned.'
The only value of heat waste to the prosecution is "what it discloses
about the interior" of a scanned object.'1 9 In at least one case,1 20 the
prosecution stipulated to the fact that thermal imagers can detect a human-
form when it is leaning against glass or a "relatively thin barrier such as
a plywood door."''" A thermal imaging device may not send out rays
or beams, but it does disclose information about the activities occurring
inside, and, as such, is highly invasive.'
.. See Ishamel, 843 F. Supp. at 213; Young, 867 P.2d at 603.1 2 Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 213.
3 United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991) (describing
the thermal imaging device as "a passive infrared instrument"), aft'd, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1993); see supra notes 92, 93 and accompanying text.
114 United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1530 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
115 Id.
" Id. (citing United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
a search may violate the Fourth Amendment despite being passive); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et
seq.).
1 See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1531; accord United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp.
205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that the government failed to establish that thermal
imaging devices were excepted from the Fourth Amendment's wan-ant requirement), rev'd,
48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (Wash. 1994).
'1, Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1530 (stating that a search may violate the Fourth
Amendment despite being passive).
19 Young, 867 P.2d at 603.
no Id. at 593.
' Id. at 595.
' See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1531; Young, 867 P.2d at 598, 603.
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Also supporting the characterization of a thermal scan as invasive is
the comparison of heat emitted from the inside of a structure to an
electronic beeper emitting signals from within a structure. In United
States v. Karo, the United States Supreme Court disallowed the monitor-
ing of a signal from an electronic beeper planted on the defendant and
unknowingly carried into his house.' Surveillance of the signal was
considered an infringement on the suspect's expectation of privacy.'
Scanning heat emitted from inside a structure follows the same premise.
Thus, a thermal imaging device scan is "at least as intrusive as the
beeper.""'5 Since the scan is so invasive, the defense asserts that the
expectation of privacy is reasonable for society to accept.
The defense points out the tension created between the right to
privacy and "rapidly evolving technological sophistication."'2" The
benefits to society of the right to privacy outweigh the benefits of
technological advances and the courts should place a limit on the "use of
technological weapons, even in the war on drugs."''" Otherwise, the
right to privacy "may be eroded without our awareness, much less our
consent."'"1 Allowing performance of "sense-enhanced observations"
without the protections afforded by a warrant leaves law enforcement
agents with a dangerous level of discretion." The defense insists that
these arguments support the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy
in heat emitted from one's property and that the court should deem
thermal scans "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
C. Results of the Arguments in the Court System
The issue of whether the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment divides
the courts. At the state court level, Washington stands sternly opposed to
2 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that monitoring a beeper in a private residence
violates the Fourth Amendment).
12 Id.
25 Young, 867 P.2d at 602.
126 United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that the
government failed to establish that thermal imaging devices were excepted from the
Fourth Amendment's wan-ant requirement), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
" Id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the District Court's acceptance of the
technology argument stating that the Ishmael's argument was "overstated" and that the
device posed "no greater intrusion on one's privacy than a precise mapping camera, an
electronic beeper, or a pen register." Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 856.
12- Young, 867 P.2d at 598.
129 Id. at 599.
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the prewarrant use of thermal imaging devices.13 Washington courts hold
that such a search violates their state constitution's protection of a citizen's
"private affairs" as well as the "reasonable search" protection under the
Fourth Amendment.' Conversely, the state courts in Arizona'3 and
Wisconsin3 have held the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices is
not a search under the Fourth Amendment and does not require a warrant.
The federal district courts are equally divided. Oddly enough, the Eastern
District of Washington has held unequivocally that a law enforcement
officert use of a thermal imaging device does "not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?"'3 Taking a stance opposite of the
Young court,35 Domitrovich stated "the defendant has failed to demonstrate
either that the thermal imaging ... conducted infringed on an actual
expectation of privacy, or, that if such an expectation existed, it is one which
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 3  District courts in Ha-
waii, 7 Pennsylvania," and Wyoming"3 have also held that the war-
rantless use of thermal imaging devices is not a search and does not invoke
Fourth Amendment protections.
While those courts upholding the lawful use of thermal imaging
devices seem to be more numerous, district courts in Texas"4 and
0 Id.; State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 993 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Young as
authority for the proposition that the use of infrared surveillance on a private dwelling
violates the federal constitution and Washington's state constitution), review denied, 891
P.2d 38 (Wash. 1995) (Table No. 62257-4).
-' Young, 867 P.2d at 599, 601.
Lu State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that thermal
imaging did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
w See State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
thermal imaging does not violate the Fourth Amendment), review denied, 515 N.W.2d
715 (Wis. 1994).
' United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1475 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding that use of thermal imaging device was not a search).
s" State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601, 604 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the use of
infrared surveillance on a private dwelling violates the federal constitution and
Washington's state constitution).
"4 DomitrovWch, 852 F. Supp. at 1475.
37 United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding
that use of a FLIR device in navigable airspace is not a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment), afld, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
Lu United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 209966, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), aft'd,
1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993).
" United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (D. Wyo. 1994).
'0o United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994). In an opinion
published after the initial draft of this Note, the Fifth Circuit overruled the District Court's
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Wisconsin 4' disagree and have held that the use is a search and
requires a warrant. The Texas court focused on a statement in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States in which the Supreme Court held aerial
surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 Nevertheless, the
Court went on to say that the use of "highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment" on private property might violate the Fourth Amendment if
conducted without a warrant.14 The Texas court stated that the thermal
imaging device was "exactly the type of sophisticated technology that
concerned the Supreme Court"' 44 in Dow and, as such, excepted it from
Dow's "approval for warrantless searches.' 45 In Wisconsin the state and
district court holdings are the reverse of the state and district court
holdings in Washington - while the state court holds the use of thermal
imaging devices not to be a search, the federal district court finds that it
is a search.'" This court adopted the Report of the Magistrate, in which
there was a very thorough review and analysis of case law on the issue
through May 1994.1"7 In the report, the Magistrate analyzed the existing
case law" and decided that the defense's arguments of an actual,
reasonable expectation of privacy were most persuasive, thus deciding the
issue was to be guided by the Fourth Amendment.
49
To further demonstrate the courts' indecision, a district court in New
York refused to rule on the use of a thermal imaging device."5 That
decision that the warrantless use of a thermal imager was unconstitutional United States
v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1995).
'4' United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (distinguishing
heat loss, which is unconscious, from abandoning garbage, which is an affirmative
decision).
142 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1986).
13 Id.
'" United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 212 (E.D. Tex. 1994). The appellate
court decision disagreed with this view. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856-57
(5th Cir. 1995).
'4 Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 212. The Ishmael court also did a reasonable expectation
of privacy test and found that defendant did have a subjective expectation of privacy and
that the expectation was reasonable. Id. The appellate court agreed with the Texas District
Court on this point. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55.
'6 United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994). For an
excellent synopsis of court holdings throughout the country on the issue of thermal
imaging, see Section I of the Magistrate's Report adopted by the court. Id. at 1525-30.
', Id. at 1518.
M'Id. at 1530-33.
'"Id. at 1533.
"0 United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that
sufficient information existed independent of infrared tracking to establish probable
cause).
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court avoided the issue by holding there was sufficient other probable
cause to support the search warrant.'
Until very recently, the federal courts of appeals also avoided
rendering a decision on the issue. A number of cases involved the use of
a thermal imaging device, but the defendant failed to contest its use, so
the court did not address the issue." In addition, in those cases where
the use of a thermal imager was not considered a search at the district
court level, the courts of appeals specifically declined to rule on the
matter and upheld the cases on other grounds."' Most notable was the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Feeney,M  the appeal of
United States v. Penny-Feeney.'55 While the prosecution often cites
Penny-Feeney, the Ninth Circuit deciding the appeal on all the evidence
except the thermal imaging device scan," upheld the validity of the
warrant." It explicitly did "not address whether any aspect of [a
thermal imager scan] during helicopter surveillance of the Feeneys' home
violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches.""58 Such explicit avoidance of the issue by the Ninth Circuit
may cast doubt upon the district court holding.
It was not until May 1994 that a court of appeals rendered a decision
on the constitutionality of prewarrant use of thermal imaging devices. The
Eighth Circuit held, in United States v. Pinson,'59 that "[a]ny subjective
11 Id. at 705.
2 United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 288 (6t1h Cir. 1994) (holding that the
thermal imager, electric bills, and an officer's visit were sufficient to establish probable
cause); United States v. Thomas, 9 F.3d 110 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ramirez,
993 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 222 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding that high electricity use, blackened windows, thermal imaging, and a
confidential informant were sufficient for probable cause).
m" United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding to District
Court for findings of fact regarding thermal imaging device capabilities); United States
v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.) (finding that an independent investigation by the
drug task force was adequate to establish probable cause), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 230
(1994); United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding other evidence
to support probable cause); United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that independent evidence established probable cause).
1 984 F.2d 1053.
.. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding
that the use of "FLIR" does not constitute a search), a'd, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
1 Feeney, 984 F.2d at 1055-56.
iId.
1 Id. at 1054-55.
" United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (finding that defendant
failed to show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one which society finds
objectively reasonable), cert denied, 115 S. Ct 664 (1994).
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expectation of privacy Pinson may have had in the heat radiated from his
house is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' '160 In September 1994 and in March 1995, the Fifth 6' and
Eleventh Circuits6  upheld the arguments of the prosecution point by
point in their holdings and found that the use of thermal imaging devices
did not constitute "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment." The Fifth Circuit applied the Katz two-part test and found the
Ishmaels did have a subjective expectation of privacy in their heat loss
but it was not one society was prepared to view as "reasonable," therefore
the use of the device was constitutional." As a result of these recent
decisions, it appears that the courts now tend toward allowing the
warrantless use of thermal imaging devices.
CONCLUSION
A. Allow the Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imaging Devices
Law enforcement agents should be allowed as much latitude as
possible to protect citizens and themselves from criminals; however, their
conduct must always pass constitutional scrutiny or society begins
moving away from a democracy and toward a police state. The capabili-
ties of advanced technological equipment often dazzle the would-be user,
yet, if limitations are not placed on the use of technological weapons, our
right to privacy "may be eroded without our awareness, much less our
consent."' 65 These considerations make the need for a clear decision
readily apparent.
The courts do not seem to favor the notion that the use of thermal
imaging violates the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Katz two-part reasonable expectation of privacy test, the
prosecution's argument is a little more sound. Any expectation of privacy
a defendant has in escaping heat is not one society is reasonably prepared
to accept. The classification of heat loss as heat waste and the analogy to
the view and treatment of garbage are very convincing, particularly in the
circumstances where heat is purposely vented.
O' Id. at 1058.
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
'6 United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994).
3 Id. at 996; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 857.
" Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 856.
165 State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (finding that warrantless infrared
surveillance violated the federal constitution and Washington's state constitution).
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It is reasonable to assume that it is not common knowledge that law
enforcement agents may scan a person's house or property to determine
the thermal output. It would follow that since such surveillance is not
common knowledge, a citizen may expect that such information is
private. However, simply because a belief is common does not mean that
it is reasonable.
Thermal scans are reasonable because their performance is not overly
invasive of one's right to privacy.'" While thermal imagers can detect
a human form when it is leaning against glass or other thin barrier, the
"detection!' referred to is shown as a gray or light gray distorted form on
the imagers view screen which one may determine to be a human
figure.' While the form is apparent, it is likely to be indistinct
Furthermore, unless a motionless person is actually leaning against or is
very near the barrier scanned, then the imager will not detect their
presence.'" The invasion described does not seem to be of a constitu-
tionally prohibitive level
The prosecution's analogy of heat loss to a "dog sniff"1269 is much
less persuasive. Unless such surveillance is performed in a public place
where no warrnt is necessary,70 a drug-sniffing dog entering private
property to locate contraband requires the authority of a warrant."'
Thermally scanned structures are usually private homes or buildings on
private land (i.e., areas generally requiring a warrant for the search to be
permissible), thus comparison to a public "dog sniff" is not so very
similar that it can be considered applicable.
The defense's "unduly invasive" argument is not convincing given
the limitations on the clarity of the images"7 within a structure scanned
by a thermal device. Yet, their analogy to limitations on the surveillance
of beepers inside a private structure is relevant and does cause a
problem for the prosecution. One possible distinction, in favor of the
prosecution, may be that the beeper monitored in the defense argument
was unknowingly carried into the home by defendant, whereas, heat is
'" See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
17 Young, 867 P.2d at 595.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
a See suqra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
170 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that using drug sniffing dogs
at an airport is not a search under the Fourth Amendment).
17 Young, 867 P.2d at 603-04 (citing United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d
Cir.), certs. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985) and 479 U.S. 818 (1986)).
17 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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knowingly created and in most indoor marijuana growing operations is
knowingly vented outside the structure. Overall, the analysis of a Katz
test favors the prewarrant use of thermal imaging devices.
Another point to consider in analyzing this issue is the type of
protection which would be provided by requiring a warrant prior to the
use of a thermal imager. The purpose of a law enforcement agent's use
of the thermal imaging device is to provide support, in addition to
evidence already obtained, for probable cause in the affidavit and
application for a search warrant. Since the scan only reveals heat
emanations and the source of the heat emanation is as likely to be from
a legal use as an illegal one, a thermal imaging scan alone would not
provide sufficient probable cause for a search. Further, probable cause is
said to be shown through a consideration of the totality of circumstances,
not just from review of a single factor.74
Persons opposed to the use of thermal imagers argue for a warrant
requirement prior to its use. In order for law enforcement to obtain a
warant, they would have to establish probable cause for its necessity. To
require a warrant (ie., probable cause) to use a device whose information
will be used to supplement probable cause for a search warrant would
render use of thermal imaging devices useless. If probable cause could be
shown, law enforcement officers would not need the thermal scan and
they would go ahead and obtain a search warrant.
Furthermore, having a warrant requirement begs the question of what
standard of review the courts should apply in granting a warrant for use
of a thermal imaging device. Should it be probable cause? Or, should it
be some lower standard such as reasonable suspicion? Or instead of a
warrant, should the requirement be one of a court order, such as those
necessary for the use of pen registers? " The use of a pen register
without a warrant does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because the
acquired information is not a communication, nor has there been a place
searched or thing seized...6 Rather, a pen register merely monitors and
records telephone numbers dialed on the phone upon which the device is
attached." Law enforcement agents can use a pen register by obtaining
7 See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 229 (D. Haw. 1991)
(pointing out that its the consideration of all "detailed interlocking infonmation' that
shows substantial basis for probable cause, not one single bit piece information), affld,
984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
'75 18 U.S.C. § 3121.
'76 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (citing United States v.
New York TeL Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
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a court order which requires less than probable cause for its issuance."8
A court order requires that law enforcement agents contact the prosecutor
and support their need for the item.' 9 The prosecutor, in turn, must
explain the necessity to a magistrate or judge to obtain the order and
certify that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation... 1.""0 If such a requirement were
imposed upon the use of a thermal imager, there would be greater
protection of Fourth Amendment rights since a prosecuting attorney must
be consulted for legal advice beforehand. In addition, a magistrate's
unbiased review of the need for the device's use would create a record for
review in a constitutional challenge.
B. Summary
The use of thermal technology as a tool for law enforcement officials
is clearly a new and evolving issue for the courts. The existing case law
on the subject only dates back to the 1991 case of United States v.
Penny-Feeney.1' Since that time, the courts' -holdings have vacillated.
Currently, the federal courts of appeals favor thermal imaging and do not
consider it a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment;
however, only three of the twelve circuits have ruled on the matter."
Tomorrow could bring another circuit holding that opposes the Fifth,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' position.
Plainly, the constitutional question regarding the prewarrant use of the
device has not been definitively answered. As a result, law enforcement
officers are unclear as to what procedures are legally possible. This is
something for the Supreme Court to consider if, and when, they review
the issue. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country deserve clear
directions on constitutional issues and to know what tools are and are not
available to them in the execution of their duties. They should not have
to be concerned with intracircuit conflicts and how other jurisdictions
18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-3123.
' Id. § 3122(a).
"0 Id. § 3122(b).
l United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991); supra note 155.
12 United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that warrantless
use of thermal imager did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ford, 34
F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a subjective expectation of privacy, which the
defendant may have had, was not reasonable); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056,
1059 (8th Cir.), ceri. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994) (holding that defendant failed to
show that his expectation of privacy is one which society finds objectively reason-
able).
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addressing the matter may influence decisions within their own jurisdic-
tion. There needs to be a clear-cut resolution concerning the permissible
use of thermal imaging devices without a warrant.
Mindy G. Wilson
